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A Rose By Any Other Name Still Has Thorns That Cut You 
Some Things To Consider. . . 
        What do we mean by communication? Is the act of understanding a space-time 
event? What is the ultimate difference between a symbol and a sign? Is a symbol 
reducible to matter and energy? Doesn't language come down to abstraction? What is 
the difference between a concrete concept and an abstract concept? Is everything what 
we think it is? Is reality a subjective creation of the mind of the individual, or is some 
part of reality subjectively interpreted while there exists an objective reality not 
dependent on our interpretation? When you think in your mind are you speaking to 
yourself? Do you always think in words? Can you think without words? Do you think 
that one can be taught to love wisdom or learning? If we reinterpret the past in terms 
of the present, how do we know the difference between reality and dreams when we 
look back? How does the intellect detach itself from reality? Do we receive reality 
through the intellect or through the senses? Does communication unify people? What 
do metaphors do? 
 
The Mystery of Language 
Excerpts from Walker Percy 
    The significance of language may be approached in the following way. In our 
ordinary theoretical view of the world, we see it as a process, a dynamic succession of 
energy states. There are subatomic particles and atoms and molecules in motion; there 
are gaseous bodies expanding or contracting; there are inorganic elements in chemical 
interaction; there are organisms in contact with an environment, responding and 
adapting accordingly; there are animals responding to each other by means of sign 
behavior. 
    A sign is something that directs our attention to something else. If you or I or a dog 
or a cicada hears a clap of thunder, we will expect rain and seek cover. It will be seen 
at once that this sort of sign behavior fits in very well with the explanatory attitude 
mentioned above. The behavior of a man or animal responding to a natural sign 
(thunder) or an artificial sign (Pavlov's buzzer) can be explained readily as a series of 
space-time events which take place because of changes in the brain brought about by 
past association. 
    But what is a symbol? A symbol does not direct our attention to something else, as 
a sign does. It does not direct at all. It "means" something else. It somehow comes to 
contain within itself the thing it means. The word ball is a sign to my dog and a 
symbol to you. If I say ball to my dog, he will respond like a good Pavlovian 
organism and look under the sofa and fetch it. But if I say ball to you, you sill simply 
look at me and, if you are patient, finally say, "What about it?" The dog responds to 
the word by looking for the thing; you conceive the ball through the word ball. 
    Now we can, if we like, say that the symbol is a kind of sign, and that when I say 
the word ball, the sound strikes your ear drum, arrives in your brain, and there calls 
out the idea of a ball. Modern semioticists do, in fact, try to explain a symbol as a kind 
of sign. But this doesn't work. As Susanne Langer has observed, this leaves out 
something, and this something is the most important thing of all. 
    The thing that is left out is the relation of denotation. The word names something. 
The symbol symbolizes something. Symbolization is qualitatively different form sign 
behavior; the thing that distinguishes man is his ability to symbolize his experience 
rather than simply respond to it. The word ball does all the things the psychologist 
says it does, makes its well-known journey from tongue to brain. But it does 
something else too: it names the thing. 
    When I name an unknown thing or hear the name from you, a remarkable thing 
happens. In some sense or other, the thing is said to "be" its name or symbol. The 
semanticists are right: this round thing is certainly not the word ball. Yet unless it 
becomes, in some sense or another, the word ball in our consciousness, we will never 
know the ball. Cassirer's thesis was that everything we know we know through 
symbolic media, whether words, pictures, formulae, or theories. As Mrs. Langer put 
it, symbols are the vehicles of meaning. 
    But when a man appears and names a thing, when he says this is water and water is 
cool, something unprecedented takes place. What the third term, man, does Is not 
merely enter into interaction with the others-though he does this too--but stand apart 
form two of the terms and say that one "is" the other. The two things which he pairs or 
identifies are the word he speaks or hears and the thing he sees before him. 
    This is not only an unprecedented happening; it is also, as the semanticists have 
noted, scandalous. A is clearly not B. But were it not for this cosmic blunder, man 
would not be man; he would never be capable of folly and he would never be capable 
of truth. Unless he says that A is B. he will never know A or B; he will only respond 
to them. 
    To summarize: Science characteristically issues in assertions. But that which 
science asserts is not itself an assertion but a space-time event. Science asserts that 
matter is in interaction, that there are energy exchanges, that organisms respond to an 
environment, etc. But the assertion itself is a pairing of elements, a relation which is 
not a space-time event but a kind of identity asserted by an assertor. 
    All of the space-time events mentioned in connection with the production of speech 
do occur, and without them there would be no language. But language is something 
else besides these events. This does not mean that language cannot be understood but 





Highlights from the last meeting. . . 
    Memories. Over time you start to forget things. You reinterpret the past in terms of 
the present moment, as opposed to recalling the past as it actually was. How do you 
know that you remember the truth? How do you know the difference between dreams 
and reality? How you remember things is a part of your personality and experiences. 
    What do we mean by communication? Do we mean only the transfer of information 
from one mind to another, or is it something more than that? Does the act of 
communicating entail a transfer of more than just data, conveying also ideas and 
emotions? 
    Evolutionarily speaking, is what humanity does with language and thought merely 
quantitatively more advanced than animals, or is there a qualitative difference 
between them? If the difference is only defined in terms of quantity, then animal 
thought could conceivable evolve to the equal status of human thought. Could this be 
true if the difference is qualitative? If the qualitative difference is a result of a critical 
mass reached through the quantitative accumulation, then an animal could reach 
human terms through mere increase of intelligence. K Could the qualitative difference 
be seen in terms of something else? 
    What is the qualitative difference between realizing the presence of danger and 
understanding Plato? In the one a response happens, in the other no physical response 
is required. And animal can recognize and react to danger, but does this reaction grow 
from an understanding of its mortality or from instinct? Animals have no 
understanding of the words "cause and effect." They have acquired cause-effect 
associations in their behavioral responses, but they don't know this. People see things 
in terms of abstract  
concepts and metaphysical ideals. A human can conceptualize the perfect rose and 
compare any rose that they see with that ideal; whereas an animal sees only the 
particular rose before them (if indeed an animal distinguishes flowers form other 
forms of plants). 
    Can there be thought without language? Does language allow thought, or can 
thought occur without a preexisting language? If you don't have a pre-existing 
language, does your mind create symbols with which you come to understand and 
contemplate the world? Does language affect the way you think? Do you always think 
in words, in effect "talking to yourself" or do you think in terms of emotion and action 
without a formal system adequate to communicate your thoughts to others? 
 
Can Desire be Taught? 
Can emotion be instilled? Can you be taught to love something? Is what you love a 
result of the experiences you have had, or is there an element of free will in what you 
desire? Can you control your own desires? Can you cause someone to love you? If 
you could, would that love mean as much to you as it would if they chose to love you? 
Would you really be able to call it "love"? 
    Where does the desire for learning come from? You can teach a student math, but 
can you teach him or her to desire to pursue it further? Can you teach somebody to 
love math for its own sake? 
    You can instill in someone the desire to acquire or avoid consequences of doing 
something, but what about the desire for the sake of the object itself? E.g., you can 
force a child to do his or her homework by offering reward or punishment, but how do 








Join us for a Social Gathering on Saturday, November lye at 7:30 p.m. Costumes are 
optional (but encouraged. . .). Dinner will be covered dish; please let us know what 
you will be bringing.  
  
 
Fall Meeting Schedule 
All meetings, held at 8:30 p.m. in Gamble Hall, room 106, are free and open 
to everyone. Wednesday. . . 
October 8 & 22  
November 5 & 19 
 
Look for the 
Philosophical Debate 
table on AASU Day- 
October 9th 
 
We have several activities planned for this year, among which are sponsoring the 2nd 
annual Philosophical Essay Contest, sponsoring a speaker in the Spring, and hosting 
social gatherings. If you would like to help with fund-raisers, or would like to make a 
donation, please contact us. 
 
The Thought Box is located in The Writing Center, Gamble Hall, room 109. It is 
there for convenient submission to The Philosopher's Stone, suggestions for future 
topics, requests to be on our mailing list, or any thoughts that you would like to share 
with us. 
Submissions to The Philosopher's Stone may address any philosophical issue, 
compare philosophical ideas, propose new topics for discussion, or address any 
previous newsletter article or topic. Works must be 250 words or less and include 
name and phone number.  
   
  
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Erik Nordenhaug, 921-7322.  
Student President: Tiffanie L.C. Rogers. 1-888-964-9543 (punch in your # at the 
beep).  
  
 
